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It was hypothesized that allocators unwittingly forge a relation between the 
availability of a resource and the worthiness of the applicants for that resource. 
In a simulation of an academic job search, graduate students were instructed to 
hire either 2 or 6 of 12 excellent candidates. Subjects spoke into a tape recordor 
reporting their initial reactions to each of the candidate’s vitae, then made their 
hiring decisions, and rated the desirability of each of the candidates. Next, they 
were told they could now hire more of the applicants if they wished to do so. 
In a control condition, subjects were treated identically to experimental subjects 
in ail aspects of the procedure but one-they did not anticipate and were not 
required to make hiring decisions. Instead, they rank ordered the applicants in 
terms of quality with the knowledge that “their department” wished to hire 
either 2 or 6 people. As hypothesized, subjects anticipating 2 appointments made 
fewer positive comments about the candidates on the audiotapes than did those 
anticipating 6 appointments; subjects in the experimental condition evaluated the 
candidates they hired more favorably than subjects in the control condition 
evaluated their own top-ranked candidates: subjects who were initially required 
to hire 2 candidates continued to employ fewer applicants than those who initially 
hired 6 when external hiring constraints were removed. The implications of the 
data for the review process in academic psychology journals were discussed. 
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When a resource is scarce, society must determine how much of it 
will be made available, within the constraints of natural scarcity and 
conflicting priorities, and who should receive it (Calabresi & Bobbitt, 
1978). We refer to this latter decision as the winnowing process. The 
purpose of the present research is to examine the facility with which 
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decision makers accept the results of winnowing and the implications of 
this acceptance. 
Our basic premise is that various psychological processes induce al- 
locators to create a dependence between the availability of a resource 
and the perceived worthiness of the applicants for the resource. Some 
examples may help elucidate this principle. The number of academic 
jobs available in a psychology department typically depends more upon 
departmental needs and economic factors than on the quality or availability 
of applicants. Similarly, grant review panels have relatively meager amounts 
of money to allocate, and journal editors work within page limitations. 
It is probably fair to say that these limitations primarily reflect economic 
and practical concerns, rather than a rigorous analysis of the number of 
“meritorious” applicants (see, e.g., Beyer (1978) for a discussion of the 
practices of scientific journals). 
Nonetheless, we propose that decision makers may come to view their 
allocation of the resource as conditioned primarily or even solely by the 
worthiness of the applicants. For instance, allocators may assume that 
these job applicants, grant requests, and manuscripts would be acceptable 
and those objectionable, almost regardless of monetary constraints, page 
limitations, and so forth. In short, judgments of relative worthiness may 
be converted to judgments of absolute worthiness, with the result that 
the general availability of the resource is seen as a reflection of the need 
or worthiness of the applicants. 
In real life, decision makers may avail themselves of a variety of 
winnowing procedures. These include lotteries and allocations based 
upon ascribed characteristics of the recipients, such as race, gender, and 
pedigree. In this paper, we limit our analysis to equal opportunity allocations 
in which decision makers attempt to distribute the resource on the basis 
of the relative worthiness of the applicants. Our analysis suggests that, 
in these latter allocations, decision makers tend to view their distribution 
of the resource as fair and just. We first consider the bases of this 
judgment, and then its implications. 
The Perception of Fairness 
Decisions regarding the general availability and distribution of a scarce 
resource are often effected by different people. For example, personnel 
officers are assigned a set of positions to fill. In such instances, resource 
availability is not the direct concern of the allocators. Their focus is on 
the winnowing process. In essence, they adopt a problem solving ori- 
entation. They employ procedures and criteria that will permit them to 
allocate the resource. 
Moreover, allocators may typically view their decisions as justifiable. 
There are several possible determinants of this perception that the win- 
nowing process yields just outcomes. First, allocators are educated to 
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accept the suitability of particular allotment procedures (Lerner, 1980). 
Second, allocators can often influence the selection of winnowing criteria 
and/or their application. This degree of freedom probably increases the 
perceived legitimacy of the decisions (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). 
In the present research we focus on two additional factors that may 
influence decision makers’ approval of the winnowing process. It is hy- 
pothesized that the general availability of the resource may affect the 
standards and evaluation strategies employed by the allocators. The severity 
of standards may vary inversely with availability. When a university 
faces a paucity of new faculty appointments, the hiring and tenure decisions 
are likely to be more stringent than when positions are readily available. 
More subtly, resource availability may alter the strategies allocators 
utilize and the information they seek in their assessments of worthiness. 
When the resource is relatively abundant, allocators may search for 
positive features, merits that would entitle an applicant to a resource, 
as well as faults. In contrast, when the resource is extremely scarce, 
allocators need to exclude the vast majority of applicants. This requirement 
may induce a focus on flaws. Evidence of nonworthiness will warrant 
rejection of an applicant. Note that it may not be necessary for allocators 
to identify a host of flaws in scarce resource conditions. Conceivably, 
a relatively few faults can serve as a basis of rejection when a resource 
is extremely limited. 
This analysis of the impact of resource availability on standards and 
evaluation strategies has an important implication. Standards and strategies 
may shift so as to provide allocators with support for their decisions. In 
scarce resource conditions, the applicants’ flaws are salient; it may thus 
seem that most of them do not deserve the resource, anyway. In more 
abundant resource conditions, the applicants’ merits also stand out; con- 
sequently, a more generous distribution of the resource may seem fair. 
Finally, once a decision has been made, concerns for consistency and 
justice may prompt cognitive changes. Allocators can justify their actions, 
postdecisionally, by making their attitudes toward the applicants fully 
consonant with their choices (Aronson, 1969; Festinger, 1957; Heider, 
1958; Olson & Zanna, 1982; Wicklund & Brehm, 1976). Successful ap- 
plicants may come to be seen as highly deserving of the resource and 
nonsuccessful applicants as unworthy of it (Lerner, 1980). 
Absolute vs. Relative Worthiness 
It seems likely that allocators are generally unaware of the impact of 
the availability of the resource on their standards, evaluation strategies, 
and postdecisional attitudes. If so, the above analysis implies that judgments 
of relative worthiness may be readily converted to assessments of absolute 
worthiness. It is our thesis that allocators tend to link their assessment 
of the fairness of the distribution process to their evaluation of the 
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fairness of the outcome. As a consequence, they perceive the resource 
as sufficiently abundant that most who deserve to obtain it, do so. In 
general, then, they tend to underestimate the impact of the overall avail- 
ability of the resource on their decisions. 
A failure to maintain a distinction between absolute and relative judg- 
ments of worthiness has at least two insidious implications. First, allocators 
may fail to agitate for an increase in total resources because the current 
allotment procedure is seen as entirely defensible. When the resource 
pool is unfairly low, however, it is important that allocators do the 
agitating. The only other probable source of discontent is the losers of 
the competition and their demands are typically rejected as self-serving. 
In addition, consider the attributional significance of underestimating 
the impact of external constraints on allocations. For example, some of 
the major journals in psychology reject over 80% of the manuscripts 
submitted. Such rejection rates reflect, in part, severe page limitations 
and the desire of editors to keep publication lags tolerable (Beyer, 1978). 
If editors and reviewers do not attribute the rejection rate, at least in 
part, to a shortage of space, they may attribute it either to the quality 
of the research, or to the nature of psychology, itself. For instance, one 
might conclude that most research being conducted today is seriously 
flawed; alternatively, one might assume that psychology is a highly sub- 
jective, nonscientific discipline in which intelligent people disagree on 
what is worth doing. Yet neither of these judgments may be entirely 
valid. If rejection rates could be reduced through the easing of page 
restrictions, then perceptions of the quality and subjectivity of the enterprise 
might be altered. 
The Current Study 
The major purpose of the present research was to examine our thesis 
that (a) the general availability of the resource affects allocators’ evaluation 
strategies, and (b) allocators’ judgments of relative worthiness are converted 
to evaluations of absolute worthiness. Our experimental test involved a 
simulation of an academic job search. Graduate students were shown 
the vitae of 12 excellent applicants. The students played the role of 
members of a hiring committee of a rapidly expanding department of 
psychology. In the experimental conditions, subjects were instructed 
either to hire two or six of the candidates. Subjects spoke into a tape 
recorder while initially reading the candidates’ vitae, reporting their re- 
actions to each. After perusing the vitae and making their hiring decisions, 
subjects rated the overall desirability of each of the candidates on bipolar 
scales. Next, experimental subjects were informed that their department 
had received additional funds. They could now hire as many more of 
the applicants as they wished. They were told, however, that they should 
hire only good people, individuals they would like to see in their own 
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department. This final hiring session provided a behavioral measure of 
subjects’ tendency to convert evaluations of relative worthiness to as- 
sessments of absolute worthiness. 
The experiment also included control conditions. Control subjects were 
treated identically to experimental subjects in all aspects of the procedure, 
but one. In contrast to experimental subjects they did not anticipate and 
were not required to make hiring decisions. 
From our assessment of the dynamics of the winnowing process, we 
derived the following hypotheses and predictions: 
(1) Resource availability affects evaluation strategies. Our analysis 
suggests that coding of the audiotapes should reveal that experimental 
and control subjects express fewer positive comments about the applicants 
when two positions are available than when six are available. The impact 
of number of positions available on frequency of negative comments is 
less evident. As noted above, when resources are scarce, a few faults 
may be sufficient to establish evidence of nonworthiness. A stronger 
prediction can, thus, be made with respect to positive than with respect 
to negative comments. 
(2) On the face of it, decisions seem more difficult as scarcity increases. 
Our analysis suggests, however, that this may not always be the case. 
If flaws can be seen as a basis for rejecting a candidate, then decisions 
can be made with some ease when resources are very limited. Although 
many candidates may be excellent, few are perfect. Decisions may actually 
be more complex when the resource is somewhat less scarce and allocation 
judgments require a careful weighting of the pluses and minuses of each 
candidate. Hence our prediction is that subjects will view their initial 
hiring decisions as more difficult when six positions are available than 
when two are available--even when the number of excellent candidates 
clearly exceeds six. 
(3) Postdecisional consistency pressures induce allocators to bring their 
attitudes in line with their decisions. There are two possible foci for a 
postdecisional shift in attitudes. Experimental subjects could exaggerate 
the merits of candidates that they hire and/or derogate the applicants 
that they reject. There is reason to believe that the enhancement effect 
may be stronger than the derogation effect. As Gerard and White (1983) 
noted, “It is the chosen alternative that the person has to live with and 
accommodating to it becomes a paramount concern. The rejected alternative 
is a foregone option” (p. 367). We assessed a postdecisional shift in 
attitudes by contrasting the ratings experimental subjects provided for 
those they hired and rejected to the ratings of comparably ranked applicants 
by control subjects who were not required to make a hiring decision. 
(4) Finally, we expected the combination of changes in evaluation 
strategies and postdecisional shifts in attitude to facilitate conversion of 
judgments of relative merit to assessments of absolute merit. This implies 
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that allocators will tend to stand by their initial evaluations when the 
resource becomes plentiful. Thus, when subjects are informed that they 
can now employ as many additional applicants as they wish, those who 
could originally hire only two should end up employing fewer candidates 
than those who could originally hire six. 
METHOD 
Subjects and Design 
The subjects were 25 female and 21 male psychology graduate students recruited by a 
fellow student. Only one of the students approached refused to be in the study. Subjects 
were paid $10.00 for their contribution. They participated individually in one session of 2 
hr and were randomly assigned to the four conditions. 
Stimulus Materials 
The 12 curriculum vitae used for the study were selected from those submitted by 
approximately 60 applicants for an actual job opening in social psychology at the University 
of Waterloo in the fall of 1981. Although there was variability in quality among the selected 
vitae, all 12 candidates were first-rate in our view. Careful attention was given to maintaining 
the confidentiality of the actual applicants through extensive changes to each of the vitae. 
The names, publications, and relevant experience of applicants were altered. The 12 candidates 
were assigned male names to hold gender constant as a factor in subjects’ evaluations. 
Procedure 
Subjects were informed that they were participating in a study of the decision making 
process. They were told that they would be reviewing and evaluating the curriculum vitae 
of 12 applicants for positions in a psychology department. They were asked to role-play 
members of a hiring committee. Preliminary instructions emphasized that subjects would 
be under time pressure to complete all aspects of the procedure in the 2-hr allotted time 
period. To assist subjects in managing their time, the experimenter suggested that they 
not spend more than 3 or 4 min, on average, reviewing each of the vitae.’ The experimenter 
also indicated that subjects were free to make brief notes as they evaluated the candidates. 
Subjects were then left alone to follow written step-by-step instructions for the balance 
of the session. After reading a brief overview of the procedure, all subjects read a detailed 
description of the department in which the competition was being held. The successful 
candidates in the competition would be the first social psychologists in a new and rapidly 
growing psychology department; they would be expected to develop and maintain a strong 
program in social psychology. The department was interested in hiring well-rounded scholars 
with demonstrated research, teaching, and administrative potential. Since the department 
was still growing, special talents or training in areas outside of social psychology such as 
statistics or survey methodology would be looked upon favorably. The department was 
stated to be strong in developmental and clinical psychology, with most of the current 
faculty members being at the assistant or associate level. 
’ Instructions encouraging subjects to manage their time efficiently were found to be 
necessary during pilot testing of the procedure. The procedure initially called for subjects 
to evaluate 20 vitae in the same period. Subjects’ intrinsic interest in the stimulus materials 
and concern for carrying out a competent evaluation resulted in a high degree of frustration 
and a 3- to 4-hr session. With the number of vitae cut back to 12, subjects reported that 
they found the procedure taxing but manageable; most completed the task within 2 hr. 
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All subjects then read detailed instructions for the evaluation phase. One set of instructions 
described the think aloud procedure. Subjects were instructed to start an audio cassette 
tape recorder as soon as they began evaluating the vitae and to “verbalize ongoing thoughts 
as they occur.” Subjects were encouraged to record their personal reactions to each of 
the vitae. All subjects received the 12 vitae in the same order. 
A second set of instructions directed subjects in the experimental conditions to hire 
either 2 or 6 of the applicants after reading all 12 vitae. Experimental subjects were provided 
with a “Hiring Decision” form that listed the names of the candidates. Subjects were 
asked to place a check beside each name in either the “Hire” or “Not Hire” column. 
Subjects read all of the vitae before making the hiring decisions. 
Experimental subjects then rated the overall quality of each candidate by placing a slash 
through 150-mm scales with end points labeled highly undesirable (1) and highly desirable 
(150). After evaluating the desirability of each candidate, experimental subjects were asked 
to reconsider the 12 candidates for positions in the same department. The instructions 
were as follows: 
It is occasionally the case that applicants for a particular job competition are 
reviewed a second time as a result of new circumstances. New hiring funds may 
become available or successful candidates may choose to go elsewhere at the last 
minute. I would now like you to go through the hiring decision process once again 
assuming that such hypothetical circumstances had arisen. In this instance, I 
would like you to consider the hypothetical extreme: assume that this large de- 
partment had unlimited resources and could hire as many candidates as it wanted 
to . . . Although the department now has unlimited resources, it is nevertheless 
committed to maintaining a high standard, so you should only hire candidates 
you consider to be highly qualified. At the extreme you could hire all 12 if you 
consider them all to be highly qualified. But make your decisions carefully. Hire 
only those you think are extremely promising and whom you would like to see 
as members of the department. 
These decisions were recorded on a form that was identical to that used for the initial 
hiring. Finally, subjects evaluated the difficulty of their hiring decisions by putting a slash 
through a 150-mm line with end points labeled not at all difficult and extremely difficult. 
Separate scales were provided for the first and second hiring decisions. 
Control subjects were asked to review the 12 candidates with the objective of rating the 
overall desirability of each, and with the knowledge that their department ultimately wished 
to hire either 2 or 6 of the applicants. After tape recording their initial reactions to the 12 
vitae, control subjects rated each candidate on the same l%mm scales completed by 
experimental subjects. Control subjects were then asked to rank order the 12 candidates, 
with no ties allowed. Their rankings of the candidates were used to create target groups 
of comparable quality and size to experimental subjects ’ “hired” and “rejected” groups. 
Subjects were debriefed in 2- or 3- person groups by one of the authors. Subjects were 
encouraged to report their perceptions of the task, including their own reports of the 
strategies they used in evaluating the candidates. Their comments revealed no awareness 
of the hypotheses being tested. 
RESULTS 
Initial Reactions 
All subjects tape recorded their initial reactions to the candidates’ 
vitae. A research assistant, blind to experimental condition, listened to 
the tapes and tabulated the number of positive and negative comments 
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subjects recorded for each of the 12 candidates. A second assistant coded 
one-third of the tapes. The correlation between the ratings of the two 
assistants was .84. 
We calculated the total number of positive and negative comments 
each subject made for the 12 candidates (see Table 1 for means). These 
totals were submitted to a 2 (experimental vs. control) x 2 (2 appointments 
vs. 6) x 2 (positive vs. negative comment) analysis of variance.* The 
first two factors were between-subject variables. The final factor was a 
within-subject variable. The analysis revealed that subjects expressed 
more positive comments, M = 60.5, than negative, M = 35.8, F(1, 38) 
= 88.9, p < .OOl. This presumably reflects, in part, the general excellence 
of the vitae. More interestingly, the interaction between number of ap- 
pointments and the nature of the comment was significant, F(1, 38) = 
6.50, p < .025. Subjects anticipating 2 appointments made fewer positive 
comments, M = 55.4, than did those anticipating 6 appointments, M = 
66.1, t(38) = 1.86, p < .05 (one-tailed). On the other hand, the frequency 
of negative comments did not differ significantly as a function of the 
number of appointments, t < 1. 
Note that comparable results were obtained in the control and exper- 
imental conditions. There were no significant main effects or interactions 
involving this variable. Thus, subjects’ evaluation strategies were influenced 
by the number of candidates to be employed but unaffected by whether 
the subjects, themselves, would do the hiring. 
The following comments provide examples of subjects’ responses to 
the vitae: 
This guy looks good. I don’t know why I don’t like him. He has got the best 
qualifications, I think, so far as publications and abilities. Maybe it is just the 
‘junior’ after his name. I always think they are being pretentious when they put 
a junior after their name. 
I like this “I’m prepared to teach” instead of just “I’m interested in”. . 
He says “I am prepared to teach”. I’d rather see if he’s interested to teach. Ok 
if you are prepared. I want more interest. 
So this guy’s got nothing out. Two in press, one in a good journal, one lousy 
. . . not very impressive. 
Oh shit, one publication but he’s got better teaching experience than guy number 
one. 
’ Four subjects were excluded from this analysis, one from each condition. The data 
were not available for three subjects because of tape recorder matfunctions; the fourth 
failed to follow the thought listing instructions. 
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TABLE I 
MEAN NUMBER OF POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE REACTIONS TO CANDIDATES’ VITAE 
Number of appointments 
Experimental Control 
2 6 2 6 
Positive comments 55.4 63.8 55.4 68.9 
Negative comments 38.4 34.9 36.7 34.0 
As these comments indicate, subjects reported candid and rather idio- 
syncratic reactions to the vitae. Some valued applied or teaching experience; 
others did not. Some counted number of publications; others emphasized 
quality over quantity and so forth. Clearly there was plenty of room for 
personal criteria to play a role in the evaluation process. 
Quality Ratings 
After making their hiring decisions, subjects in the experimental con- 
ditions evaluated the desirability of each of the applicants. Control subjects 
made similar ratings prior to ranking the candidates. We compared the 
evaluations control subjects reported for their top 2 (Zappointment con- 
dition) or top 6 (dappointment condition) ranked candidates to the eval- 
uations experimental subjects assigned to the candidates they hired. This 
procedure compares experimental and control subjects’ evaluations of 
the candidates they judged to be superior. A 2 x 2 between-subjects 
analysis of variance revealed two significant main effects. Subjects in 
the experimental conditions made more favorable evaluations, M = 123.23, 
than subjects in the control conditions, M = 112.94, F(1, 42) = 5.19, 
p < .05. In addition, subjects’ evaluations of the top 2 candidates in the 
2-appointment conditions exceeded the evaluations of the top 6 candidates 
in the 6-appointment conditions, F(1,42) = 11.04, p < .Ol, MS of 125.71 
and 110.70, respectively (which is not surprising, as the 6-appointment 
condition includes less desirable candidates). 
Comparable analyses were conducted on ratings of candidates who 
were either not hired by the experimental subjects or who were ranked 
by control subjects lower than 2 (Zappointment condition) or 6 (6- 
appointment condition). There were no significant effects in mean eval- 
uations of these inferior candidates. Most important, the difference in 
the quality ratings of experimental, h4 = 70.5, and control, M = 68.0, 
subjects did not approach significance, F < 1. 
Second Hiring Decision 
We examined the second hiring decision to assess the number of can- 
didates employed in the experimental conditions when external hiring 
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TABLE 2 




First hiring decision 65.6 83.2 
Second hiring decision 94.6 85.1 
Notes. (1) The data are from experimental subjects 
only. (2) Scale values range from 1 to 150. with 
larger values indicating more difficulty. 
constraints were removed. As anticipated, subjects in the 2-appointment 
condition would have hired fewer applicants under conditions of abundance, 
M = 6.23, than subjects in the 6-appointment condition, M = 8.08, 
t(18.6) = 3.46, p < .01.3 
Perceived Difficulty of the Hiring Decisions 
At the conclusion of the study, experimental subjects rated the difficulty 
of their hiring decisions on two bipolar scales. The mean ratings are 
shown in Table 2. A 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted on these data. 
Experimental condition (2 appointments vs. 6) was a between-subjects 
variable and hiring decision (first vs. second) a within-subjects variable. 
The ANOVA yielded a main effect for hiring decision, F(1, 23) = 
5.33, p < .05. Subjects rated the second hiring decision as more difficult 
than the first. This main effect is qualified by a marginally significant 
interaction, F(1, 23) = 4.09, p = .055. As predicted, subjects in the 6- 
appointment condition judged the first hiring decision to be more difficult 
than did subjects in the 2-appointment condition (see Table 2). In contrast, 
subjects in the 2-appointment condition reported greater difficulty in 
making the second hiring decisions than did subjects in the 6-applicant 
condition. This latter trend may simply reflect the fact that subjects in 
the 2-appointment condition had a greater number of candidates to re- 
consider during the second hiring decision. It should be noted, however, 
that simple effects analysis revealed that neither of these trends attained 
statistical significance. 
Regression Analyses 
We examined whether subjects’ preliminary reactions to the candidates 
(obtained from the audiotapes) predicted their initial hiring decisions, 
3 The degrees of freedom used were fractional because the variances were heterogeneous 
and a separate variance t value was calculated. The procedure is described in Myers (1979). 
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their quality ratings, and second hiring decisions. Multiple regression 
analyses were performed separately in the experimental and control con- 
ditions. In all of the analyses, the frequency of positive and negative 
comments were entered as predictors. In the experimental condition, the 
multiple R was significant for the initial hiring measure, F(2, 20) = 
4.57, p < .025 (R’ = .31), the quality ratings, F(2, 20) = 5.16, p < .025 
(R* = .34), and marginally significant for the second hiring measure, 
F(2, 20) = 2.60, p < .10 (R2 = .21). In the control condition, the multiple 
R relating initial reactions to quality ratings was significant, F(2, 16) = 
4.98, p < .025 (R* = .38). 
The standardized regression coefficients, p, obtained from the regression 
analyses are shown in Table 3. As Table 3 reveals, the frequency of 
positive comments was a significant predictor of all of the criteria; whereas, 
the frequency of negative comments was a weaker predictor in the ex- 
perimental condition. It is important to emphasize, though, that direct 
contrasts indicated that positive and negative comments did not differ 
significantly in terms of the absolute strength of their relationship to the 
various criteria (ignoring sign). 
A second set of analyses was conducted entering number of candidates 
to be hired (2 vs. 6) as a dummy variable. The results reported above 
were not altered significantly by this addition. 
In summary, then, the regression analyses indicate a relation between 
subjects’ initial reactions to the candidates and subjects’ subsequent 
judgments. Generally, the more positive and fewer negative comments 
subjects made initially, the more likely a candidate was to be hired and 
the more favorable the evaluation. 
TABLE 3 
RELATION OF INITIAL REACTIONS TO THE CANDIDATES TO HIRING DECISIONS AND QUALITY 
RATINGS 
Frequency of positive Frequency of negative 
comments comments 
Condition Experimental Control Experimental Control 
Initial hiring .43* - .34 
Quality ratings .49* .41* - .30 - .49* 
Second hiring .40* -.20 
Notes. (1) *p < .05. (2) Entries are beta coefficients from regression equations. The 
correlations used for the regression analyses were means calculated by converting the 
correlation for each job applicant to a 2 score, using Fisher’s Y to Z transformation. The 
Z scores were then averaged for the 12 applicants using the formula described in Hays 
(1981, p. 467). The resulting mean Z score was converted back to r. (3) The minus signs 
indicate that the fewer the negative comments, the more likely a person was to be hired, 
and the higher his quality rating. 
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Intersubject Agreement on Hiring Decisions 
Although it was not a major focus of the current study, we examined 
the degree to which subjects agreed on the persons to be hired. We 
calculated agreement using Kappa (K), a statistic that shows the proportion 
of agreement remaining after chance agreement is removed (Fleiss, 1971; 
Watkins, 1979). The Kappa statistic can range from negative values 
(below chance agreement) through zero (chance agreement) to + 1.00 
(perfect agreement), and is distributed as a standard normal variate. 
First, let us consider the initial hiring decisions. In the condition in 
which 2 candidates were hired, a K of .07 was produced, which is not 
significantly different from chance agreement. When 6 candidates were 
hired, a K of .23 resulted, 2 = 2.15, p < .05. This figure indicates that 
23% greater than chance agreement was obtained. Though the agreement 
was significantly above chance, it was not very high in absolute terms. 
Intersubject agreement did not rise when subjects were “released” 
from their initial hiring constraints and were permitted to hire more 
candidates. The Kappa for the second hiring decision was .076 in the 
condition in which 2 candidates were hired initially, and .19 in the condition 
in which 6 candidates were hired initially. Neither value significantly 
exceeds chance agreement. 
The low agreement may be due, in part, to our procedure. We presented 
subjects with 12 strong candidates. If we had included applicants who 
were obviously weak, overall intersubject agreement might increase. 
Subjects would be likely to agree that such mediocre candidates should 
be excluded from the final pool. 
Note, though, that low agreement among judges is not unique to our 
experimental situation. For example, several studies of agreement among 
reviewers of manuscripts for major psychology journals obtained KS of 
below .30 (Peters & Ceci, 1982; Watkins, 1979). 
DISCUSSION 
As hypothesized, subjects’ evaluation strategies differed as a function 
of the number of appointments available. The evidence is not that subjects 
in the 2-appointment condition searched for more faults, but rather that 
they overlooked some of the positive features of the candidates noted 
by subjects in the 6-appointment condition. 
The obtained interaction is compatible with our theoretical analysis. 
Allocators in both scarce and relatively abundant resource conditions 
are motivated to look for faults in applicants. When the resource is 
abundant, however, subjects have an additional impetus to search for 
the merits of a candidate. In the current study, subjects in the 6-appointment 
condition need be just as concerned with finding reasons to accept a 
candidate, as with finding grounds to reject him. 
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This asymmetical impact of scarcity on evaluation strategies is also 
intuitively appealing. Consider: Your manuscript is rejected by a journal 
editor. The reviewers’ complaints may not surprise you. The flaws are 
there and you know what they are. What is disturbing, though, is that 
the reviewers failed to see a number of the positive aspects of the piece 
which, in your view, outweighed the failings. Allocators are more inclined 
to accentuate the positive when resources are abundant. 
The lack of difference between the initial reactions of control and 
experimental subjects suggests that the important determinant of evaluations 
at the predecisional stage is scarcity of the resource, rather than the 
responsibility of making a choice. In contrast, the quality ratings reflect 
the impact of having to make a decision. Experimental subjects evaluated 
the applicants they employed more favorably than control subjects eval- 
uated their own top applicants.4 
Experimental subjects did not appear to derogate unsuccessful applicants, 
relative to ratings provided by control subjects. A similar result was 
obtained by Gerard and White (1983) in a quite different context. In an 
experiment in which subjects selected paintings, these authors found 
reevaluation of only the chosen alternatives. 
Though this finding does not seem limited to the current experimental 
context, the possible impact of the simulation aspect of our study must 
be acknowledged. Because it was a simulation, subjects need not worry 
about actually harming their rejected applicants. Consequently, there 
would be little reason for a guilt-induced shift in evaluation of the rejected 
candidates. Even in a real competition, however, one could suppose that 
if a rejected applicant is any good, then he or she will get other jobs. 
In such situations, then, decision makers may be more concerned with 
justifying their selections than their rejections. 
To this point, we have assumed that subjects in the experimental 
conditions exaggerate the quality of the candidates they hire. Conceivably, 
the locus of the effect is in the control condition. The quality rating 
possibly took on greater significance for control than for experimental 
subjects. Subjects in the experimental conditions presumably saw the 
hiring decisions as the focus of the study; those in the control condition 
may have attributed similar significance to the quality ratings. As a result, 
4 We have reasoned that differences in the quality ratings of experimental and control 
subjects reflect postdecisional reevaluations by experimental subjects. Conceivably. however, 
comparable differences may have emerged prior to the hiring decision. We attempted to 
evaluate this alternative by examining subjects’ initial reactions to the candidates (i.e., the 
number of positive and negative comments). There were no differences between the initial 
reactions of experimental subjects to candidates they eventually employed in the first hiring 
session and the initial reactions of control subjects to comparably ranked candidates (top 
2 or 6). There were also no experimental-control differences for candidates eventually 
rejected or ranked low. Although comparing across different measures is hazardous. these 
data bolster our position that the effects obtained subsequently on the quality ratings 
emerged postdecisionally. 
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control subjects’ quality ratings may have reflected a concern for impression 
management that was absent in the experimental condition. Control subjects 
may have believed that they could present a more perspicacious image 
of themselves by providing moderate evaluations, rather than appearing 
too enthusiastic about a candidate. 
There is reason to suspect, though, that control subjects’ quality ratings 
are not simply efforts at self-presentation. Control subjects were not 
more cautious in their initial, tape-recorded evaluations than experimental 
subjects. Further, these initial evaluations predicted the quality ratings 
as strongly in the control as in the experimental conditions. Thus, the 
ratings of control subjects seem to reflect genuine assessments of the 
candidates. 
The second hiring decision, where subjects were given the opportunity 
to employ as many applicants as they wished, constituted the final de- 
pendent measure. Ideally, we would have found little or no increase in 
number of candidates employed from the first decision. This would have 
provided the most dramatic evidence that judgments of relative worthiness 
are converted to judgments of absolute worthiness. Practical considerations 
led us to construct a set of vitae that made such results highly improbable, 
however. We had to provide enough good candidates so that subjects 
in the Gappointment condition could find 6 desirable applicants and even 
hire more when the restraints were removed. This meant that the subjects 
in the 2-appointment condition, in particular, had a number of candidates 
they could still hire who would grace virtually any department in North 
America. Nonetheless, those who initially hired only 2 applicants continued 
to employ fewer candidates than those who originally hired 6. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) noted that people often fail to make 
necessary adjustments of initial judgments. For example, in one study 
subjects were asked to adjust an arbitrary initial estimate of the percentage 
of African countries in the United Nations. Those starting with “anchors” 
of 10 and 65% produced adjusted estimates of 25 and 45%, respectively. 
In the present study, the continued impact of the manipulation of 2 vs. 
6 appointments on the number of candidates hired when constraints were 
removed can be depicted as a failure to adjust an initial “anchor” suf- 
ficiently. More important, though, we have described and assessed two 
psychological processes that appear to mediate this phenomenon, subjects’ 
initial evaluation strategies and their postdecisional shifts in attitude. The 
implication is that allocators accepted the validity of the results of the 
winnowing procedure and failed to appreciate fully the impact of external 
constraints on this process. 
Finally, we consider the implications of the current data for the review 
process in psychology. In discussing the high rejection rates in major 
psychology journals, Robert Adair (1982), a Yale physicist, noted that 
such difhculties do not exist in his discipline. He attributed the discrepancy 
to the “relative simplicity and objectivity of physics and the complexity 
and subjectivity of many areas in psychology” (p. 196). 
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Adair subsequently noted, in passing, that the most important physics 
journal, Physical Review, publishes 30,000 pages per year and has an 
80% acceptance rate. We suggest that the perception of the relative 
subjectivity of our science might largely disappear if the Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology could publish, say, 20,000 pages a year 
and sustain an acceptance rate of 80%. 
Such an expansion may be neither feasible nor desirable. What is 
important, though, is that social psychologists and others recognize the 
impact of arbitrarily established high rejection rates on the allocation 
and inference process. Moreover, social psychologists should not be 
misled by the apparent facility and efficiency with which the review 
process is conducted. One troubling aspect of the current data is that 
subjects see decisions made under scarcity as quite easy to make. As 
our agreement statistic indicates, however, that ease should not be in- 
terpreted as evidence for the reliability of the decision process. 
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